The gauntlet has been thrown. Or has it?

Members of a Senate Appropriations panel, yesterday, approved legislation that sought to roll back some of the travel restrictions that have been in place since 2004 (see here or here). This legislation also included a measure to make it easier for US agricultural exporters to sell their wares to the Cuban regime. But with opposition from several Senators (who can place a legislative hold on these measures) and the White House, whether or not you support this change in travel policy (or House plans to expand the definition of "family" in regards to this travel), don't expect any changes soon. Yet, while you likely won't see much movement or a full vote on this legislation until next year, it will no doubt spark further debate about the merits of this potential policy shift, from DC to Miami and everywhere in between.

There are certain things that should be recognized at the outset. For instance, that this vote took place now without any expectation that it would get passed into law until 2009 or beyond, suggests that Democratic congressional leaders would like to make sure that this issue remains contentious during this election season. Seemingly emboldened by certain poll results suggesting that more Cuban-Americans support a loosening of these travel restrictions than support them (see here), Democratic aspirants to Congress and the White House view this as a classic wedge issue and will undoubtedly exploit it as one. The Republicans seem to be willingly or unwittingly playing into their hands by drawing the proverbial line in the sand on this issue (see here).

Both sides of this debate make strong arguments, and so it seems as though the best approach might lie somewhere in between, in which Cuban-Americans are given some added flexibility to directly help Cuban dissidents and to visit ailing family members, but doing so in a way that effectively limits the undeniable financial benefit that the regime would thus reap. So here's a question: what do you consider the strongest arguments for and against current travel restrictions? And what would you consider a suitable and acceptable compromise between both sides of this debate?

It seems as though unless the Cuban-American community begins to civilly sort through these issues now and arrives at pragmatic consensus, the bitter wedge politics will continue through, and far beyond, this November.

But will it? The alternative view to all of this is that this "wedge" is nothing but a clever political construct that does not deserve all of the attention it is currently receiving. The difference between 1 visit every 3 years, to 1 visit per year, and between a per diem spending limit of $50 and $170, can't be honestly viewed as a wide gulf, especially in light of the different ways these things are circumvented and/or not exercised (e.g. non-direct travel and the relatively small number of people choosing to go back to Cuba that frequently).

I think the real story here is what's not being debated. Thanks largely to the efforts of the exile community, the Cuban regime has been widely seen by Americans for what they are - a vile, human-rights abusing, totalitarian dictatorship. Politicians have seen the futility of economic and diplomatic engagement with Cuba that Europe and the rest of the world have constantly attempted with nothing to show for their efforts (besides, of course, the profiting of companies doing business with the Cuban state and thus exploiting Cuban workers). And how does Cuba reward the EU for lifting its sanctions? By continuing to imprison and harass dissidents, by disregarding international agreements that it has hypocritically signed, and by railing against the very countries that did their bidding.

Meanwhile, we witness a similarly vile regime in North Korea, using diplomatic channels very far short of normalization, begin to give up its nuclear ambitions in exchange for the gradual or potential loosening of some US-imposed sanctions (see here or here), thus apparently giving the US one of its biggest victories in years (although compliance and much else remains to be seen) and illustrating the real diplomatic and bargaining power of strong sanctions.

That we're currently debating the aforementioned (non-?)issue, rather than the embargo itself or normalization of relations, let alone the totalitarian regime's nature or merits, should be reason enough to celebrate our past successes and maintain our unity now and in the uncertain future.