It has been well-noted that the recent economic "alterations" (e.g., allowing Cubans access to hotels and beaches, permitting the purchase of cell phones and computers, etc.) instituted by Gen. Raul Castro on the heals of his brother's withdrawal have generated much "ballyhoo" both inside and especially outside of Cuba.
Some observers (and including some posters on this site) have myopically argued that these are strong signals of Raul's and his cadre's willingness to engage in an eventual economic and political "apertura" (or opening). Others have pragmatically argued for a "wait and see" approach noting that we have been down this road before (e.g., the "Special Period", etc. ) and often during the Castro brothers' near 50-year tyrannical rule of Cuba. The latter point to the formula that has been revisited time and time again by the Castro brothers: meager economic adjustments cloaked in the veil of something approaching substantive economic reform, followed by a muddled and dysfunctional economic policy, followed by a reactionary halt to further reforms and of course an increase in repression.
In his article "Back to the Past with Raul" (full excerpt below), Prof. Jaime Suchlicki makes the case for the latter camp and posits compelling evidence that this "tried and true" formula is being revisited by Raul and his cadre today. In it, Suchlicki succintly notes that the "recent rise to the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party of Ramiro Valdez, the dreaded former Interior Minister, and of General Alvaro Lopez Miera, Chief of Staff of Cuba’s Armed Forces" ensures that "the most anti-reformists, hard line leaders are in the succession line after Raul, signaling an unwillingness of the Cuban regime to open up the economic process further and certainly not to open the political process." So, at least in the case of Cuba, what is old is new and what is new is old.
Where do you fall? If neither, what do you think is most likely alternative scenario in the short term?
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"An Information Service of the Cuba Transition ProjectInstitute for Cuban and Cuban-American StudiesUniversity of Miami
Issue 96
May 27, 2008
Jaime Suchlicki*
BACK TO THE PAST WITH RAUL
The economic adjustments initiated by General R\aul Castro after assuming total power on February 24, 2008, seem to be coming to an end. The rise to the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party of Ramiro Valdez, the dreaded former Interior Minister, and of General Alvaro Lopez Miera, Chief of Staff of Cuba’s Armed Forces, indicates a hardening of policy. As Cuba stands now, the most anti-reformists, hard line leaders are in the succession line after Raul, signaling an unwillingness of the Cuban regime to open up the economic process further and certainly not to open the political process.Why the change? Or why the unwillingness to continue the process of opening? First, Raul is no Gorbachev and no Deng Xiaoping. He is willing to correct some of the glaring irritants in Cuban society – not allowing Cubans access to hotels and beaches, permitting the purchase of cell phones and computers (without Internet access), borrowing land to produce food, etc. Yet, he is unwilling to move the island much beyond.His emphasis has been on discipline, productivity and efficiency, particularly in the agricultural sector. To this end he is reorganizing and streamlining Cuba’s Communist Party to act as the watchdog over agricultural production. The same way he entrusted the military with running Cuba’s major industries and businesses, General Castro is now turning to the Party to do the same in the agricultural sector.The second reason for halting the adjustments is that the Cuban leadership has seen the reaction of the Cubans and fears possible instability. The recent changes have unleashed the Cubans’ long suppressed expectations and desires. Dissidents have been emboldened and are pushing for reforms, particularly political ones. The population at large is not satisfied with the limited changes and is asking for more. Divisions between the haves and have nots have increased, as well as between the whites and blacks that do not have family abroad and have little access to foreign currency.The most likely scenario, therefore, in the short run, is a muddling through economic policy, a halt to further reforms, and an increase in repression. The death of Fidel Castro will also usher in a period when his legacy will be proclaimed, repeated and studied – a legacy of anti-Americanism, strict Marxist orthodoxy and discipline. This back to the past is a bad omen for the future of the long suffering Cuban people.
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* Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. He is the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and of the recently published Breve Historia de Cuba."
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Thursday, May 29, 2008
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4 comments:
by opening up a little bit Raul Castro is hoping to keep the people of Cuba a little bit happier and thus keep his regime in check-this is more of the same
False dychotomy: either you are a myopic dupe or a pragmatic sage. Mmmm, when you put it that way...
One could start by pointing out that the recent reforms are of an order of magnitude slightly larger than the opening of Mercados Libres Campesinos in the 80s or allowing paladares in teh 90s. Or that commissars Valdez and Lopez Miera are political hardliners no doubt, but where's the evidence that they are against making money? Or that saying Raul is no Xiaoping kinda shows Prof. Suchlicki doesn't know much about Xiaoping.
Let me posit to you that the issue is not in which camp you fall, the issue is whether your reaction to Raul's moves will advance your objective. You can be an espectator, rosy-eyed or cynical, all you want. But to be an actor? Ultimately I'm more interested in seeing how US policymakers and the exile community in particular adapt so they are not left behind.
Oh yeah, likely scenario: boy, I suck at prognosticating. I don't think it'll be more of the same though. I think there will be more gradual measures from now until the PCC Congress of 2009, where some kind of sweeping package will be announced (but of course, no political reforms). I think if there's a lesson Raul has taken from China and Vietnam (and Venezuela to a point) is that people will put up with a lot as long as they are given a little and that's easier to control with bread than with tanks. Maybe I'm completely wrong but I like this scenario better than Suchlicki's doom and gloom.
please don't post anymore Suchlicki rhetorical pieces. They all read the same-nothing new, nothing academic about the conclusions. I could get the same analysis at the Versailles window.
A,
Sorry to offend your academic predilections or stirred your seeming animus toward Professor Suchlicki, but I would respectfully disagree.
Professor Suchlicki's piece posits what many would argue to be the sobering truth about Cuba under Raul's brief rule, and oh by the way, in listening to an active political dissident on the island recently, the cycle of repression that Prof. Suchlicki refers to in his piece is very much real and has peaked in recent months to levels not seen in some time.
On the subject of your presumptive and cynical invitation to talk Cuban politics at the Versailles pick up window, it would behoove me to tell you as a matter of disclosure that I was actually there middle of last week to pickup a chicken sandwhich (with extra chicken, gotta get my protein) on a wheat baguette (gotta stick to the diet) and from time to time find myself there for that item and so I welcome the opportunity to table this discussion for a future time and date there. If not, and when you're in the area, I can readily be found at Gold Gym's just a couple of blocks away and would be pleased to also enlist the participation of other recent Cuban emigres who are opinionated folks.
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